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during the initial recovery stages.  This chapter has  documented the rapid 
accumulation of  external debts beginning in the early 1960s. 
The  chapter  has  made  four  main  points.  First,  most  of  the  debt 
accumulation took place during 1966-69,  1974-75,  and 1979-82.  Second, 
growth of  the nominal debt stock overstates the burden of  the debt because 
of  the  very  rapid  growth rates  of  GNP  and  exports.  As  we  shall see  in 
chapter  7,  a  substantial  portion  of  Korean  growth  is  attributable  to 
investments financed by foreign borrowing. 
Third,  Korea’s debt has  been  used  primarily to finance current account 
deficits. For  this reason,  subsequent chapters will focus on the behavior of 
domestic savings and investment,  recognizing that  the excess of  domestic 
savings over investment is the counterpart to a current account imbalance. 
Finally,  Korea,  unlike  many  other  developing  countries,  has  carefully 
monitored foreign borrowing.  Up-to-date and accurate statistics are main- 
tained. In  fact, the allocation of  foreign (and domestic) credit has played a 
central  role  in  Korea’s  growth  strategy,  facilitating  the  rapid  growth  of 
exports.  Comprehensive and  current information has  also enabled policy- 
makers  to  react  relatively  quickly  to  external  and  internal  economic 
developments. 
4  Three Cycles of  Debt 
Accumulation,  1960 -  86 
This chapter examines Korea’s macroeconomic performance and experience 
with external debt from 1960 to 1986. As pointed out in chapter 3, most of 
Korea’s  debt  was  accumulated  during  one  of  three  periods:  1966-69, 
1974-75,  or 1979-81.  Each period can be characterized as a cycle in which 
an initial phase of  economic difficulty and growth slowdown was followed 
by  a subsequent recovery with resumed growth.  As we shall see, only the 
economic downturn during the third cycle was severe enough to be classified 
as  a  crisis  by  international  standards.  However,  all  three  declines  in 
performance were viewed  with concern by  Korean  policymakers. Each  of 
the  three  cycles  also  involved  important  shifts  in  economic  policy  as 
domestic authorities responded to external developments and to changes in 
domestic macroeconomic performance. 
While it is convenient to discuss each cycle separately, it is also important 
to  identify  the  broad  trends  which  developed  throughout  Korea’s  recent 
history. In particular, when we pick up the story, Korea has a war-devastated 
economy,  heavily dependent on  foreign aid.  By  1986 it  has  successfully 183  KoredChapter 4 
weathered  the  international debt  crisis.  In  sharp  contrast to  most  other 
developing  country  debtors  in  which  policy  has  remained  focused  on 
macroeconomic stabilization (balance of  payments and/or prices), the focus 
of  Korean policy returned to the issues of  long-term growth and structural 
development. The major external “problem”  was  a large current account 
surplus-a  problem  which  placed  Korean  policy  debates much  closer to 
those of  Japan than to those of other debtor countries. 
4.1  Economic Growth and External Borrowing, 1960-73 
Korea’s first cycle of  debt accumulation, crisis, and recovery coincides 
with a number of changes in the Korean economy. First, shifts in economic 
policies following the 1961 military coup have generally been identified as 
the beginning of  Korea’s export-oriented growth, with rapid expansions of 
both exports and GNP.  Second, the period follows shortly after the decline 
in grants and military aid from the United States and the subsequent push for 
substitute funding by the Korean government. 
Third, the growth rate of  the Korean capital stock accelerates markedly 
after 1966 following relatively slow growth during the period 1953-66.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  growth  rates  of  exports  and  GNP  responded  very 
favorably, jumping from annual averages of  8 and 3 percent, respectively, 
during 1953-66  to 37  and  10 percent during 1966-70.  At the same time, 
inflation rates remained stable but quite high (15- 16 percent). The period is 
characterized by  rapidly increasing employment, increases in both manufac- 
turing wages and farm incomes, and rising wage-rental ratios. On the other 
hand,  investment  exceeded  domestic  saving,  despite  the  rise  in  saving 
following  the  1965  financial  reforms.  Korea  ran  large  current  account 
deficits during the period from  1965 to  1969 and  financed the deficits by 
external borrowing. As a share of GNP, debt rose from 6.9 percent in  1965 
to 27.2 percent in  1969. 
Severe problems had emerged by  1970. The contributing factors included 
a sharp drop in private saving rates, an overvalued exchange rate, and rising 
unit labor costs. By  1973, however, the economy was booming. 
We  begin  with  a background review of  developments during  1960-65 
Section 4.1.2 gives an analysis of the debt accumulation period from 1966 to 
1969 leading up to the crisis. Section 4.1.3 provides an examination of the 
components of the subsequent recovery. In section 4.1.4 we assess the extent 
to  which  any  underlying  structural weaknesses  had  been  addressed, and 
examine the relative roles of  policy, luck,  and  economic structure in  the 
1973 performance. The discussion refers to the economic indicators given in 
table 4.1. 
4.1.1  Background, 1960-65 
The period 1960-65  was a time of  major transitions. At the outset, two 
critical features of  the Korean economy were its trade policy  of  “import 184  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
Table 4. I  Major Economic Indicators, 1964-73 
1964-65  1966-67  1968-69  1970  1971  1972  1973 
GNP growth rate 
Export growth rate 
Inflation (CPI) 
Current account  (9%  GNP) 
Fixed investment (9%  GNP) 
Domestic savings (9%  GNP) 
M2 growth rate 







Terms of trade 
Real effective exchange rate 
Won/$ 
7.7  9.7  12.3 
42.1  35.4  39.5 
18.1  11.0  15.5 
0.3  -3.7  -8.4 
15.0  21.1  26.5 
14.2  17.0  20.8 
33.8  61.7  66.7 
20.3  19.9  30.6 
1.6  8.  I  16.9 
2.9  3.9  13.3 
13.2  10.9  23.2 
84.6  97.1  101.0 
116.7  104.3  98.0 





























































Source:  EPB, Major Statistics of  Korean Economy, review issues, and BOK, Economic Sratisrics Yearbook. 
Note:  National income data prior to  1970 are based on  1975 constant  prices, old SNA.  1970-73  data are 
based on new SNA. 
‘From Korea productivity center, output per production  worker. 
substitution  of  nondurable  consumer  and  intermediate  goods  behind  the 
protective wall of  tariffs and quotas”  (Hong  1979, 245) and its overvalued 
exchange rate.  Growth rates  were  low,  however,  in  contrast to  the  high 
inflation  in  the  early  1950s-a  financial  stabilization program  (including 
quarterly ceilings for  the  growth of  monetary  aggregates) combined with 
restrictive fiscal policy helped to stabilize prices during 1957-61. 
Political  developments set  the  stage for  a  significant policy  shift.  The 
student uprising in April  1960 force the resignation of  President Syngman 
Rhee.  The new  government,  led  by  Chang Myon,  collapsed  following a 
military coup in May  1961 led by  General Park Chung Hee. General Park 
was elected president of a civilian government in 1964. The new government 
embarked  on  an  active,  comprehensive  policy  of  export  promotion  to 
encourage growth.  Although the  policies have  also involved some import 
substitution, and although some measure were undertaken in  1961 (notably 
the unification of a complex system of multiple exchange rates), we  identify 
1962  as  the  beginning  of  the  “export-orientation’’  phase  of  Korean 
development. 
The cornerstone of the new approach to economic management has been a 
series  of  five-year  development plans.  As  we  shall  see,  the  plans  have 
involved  shifting combinations of  liberalization (particularly  in  the  trade 
regime),  government  intervention (most obviously through  financial  mar- 
kets), and concern over macroeconomic stability. The mainstay has been a 
desire to  maintain  high  rates of  growth.  This  has  been  achieved  through 185  KoredChapter 4 
increasingly  high  rates  of  capital  formation  in  export  industries.  Except 
perhaps in the most recent period, this has put stable, credible incentives for 
exporters as a top priority. 
The first five-year plan (1962-66)  targeted fixed capital formation to grow 
at an average rate of  14.6 percent. However, domestic sources of  financing 
were limited: domestic bank savings were small, and domestic commercial 
banks  were  not  accustomed  to  or  equipped  for  long-term  loans,  unless 
ordered  to  undertake  them  by  the  government.  Hong  (1979,  142,  257) 
estimates that short-term credit for exports and long-term credit for export 
promotion amounted to only 3 percent and  1-2  percent of total bank loans, 
respectively.  (He uses  medium  Industry Bank  Loans and foreign currency 
loans to  estimate total  long-term loans for export  promotion.)  The major 
source of  domestic long-term funding, the Korea Reconstruction Bank, had 
access  to  only  limited  funds  through  the  government.  Furthermore,  the 
slowdown of  aid inflows after massive foreign aid during 1957-61  signaled 
a critical need for alternative financing. 
The government had begun a concerted effort to encourage foreign loans 
and  investments in  1960. The Foreign Capital Inducement and Promotion 
law,  the first  of  a series of  new  laws  and regulations,  focused on foreign 
loans,  foreign  direct  or  joint  investments,  and  capital  and  technology 
inducements. It  granted  a number of  special incentives,  including special 
income  tax  provisions  for  interest  earnings  arising  from  foreign  loans. 
Foreign  investment businesses  were  allowed  exemptions  on  income  and 
corporate taxes and on tariffs on their imports of  capital equipment (Hong 
1979, 141). In  1962 the government instituted the system of  guarantees to 
foreign lenders and investors. As described in chapter 3, each private loan or 
project  was  examined  individually.  Those  which  were  authorized  also 
received a guarantee of repayment from the KDB and BOK, together with a 
guarantee of  repatriation of  funds. 
Two  problems  emerged  in  1963:  a  resurgence  of  inflation  and  a 
deterioration in the balance of  payments. A number of  factors contributed. 
Macroeconomic  policies  had  been  very  expansionary during  the  military 
government  of  1960-6 1-large  fiscal  deficits  were  financed  through 
borrowing from the BOK. There were two poor agricultural harvests-rice 
in fall 1962 and barley in spring 1963. U.S. aid flows declined substantially. 
Multiple  exchange  rates  were  reintroduced  during  1963,  and  import 
controls were tightened. However, it is important to  note that incentives to 
exporters were kept relatively constant during this period (Frank, Kim, and 
Westphal 1975). A joint U.S.-Korea stabilization agreement during 1963-64 
reduced the fiscal deficit, introduced credit ceilings, and controlled lending 
to the private sector. It is also notable that Korea began its industrialization 
with a period of  wage restraint. Real wages fell by  over 10 percent between 
1962 and 1964. Available evidence suggests that labor productivity increased 
strongly during the same period.' 186  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
A series of  reforms were  instituted following the  1964 election.  Under 
U.S.  pressure,  the exchange rate  was  devalued and  import  controls were 
reduced. Beginning &I964  the exchange rate took on a more prominent role 
in  Korean  economic management.  Measures were  undertaken  to  increase 
both public  and private savings. Partly  in  response to these contractionary 
measures, in 1964 there was an improved current account, a sharp decline in 
imports, and reduced industrial growth. That year also seems to have marked 
the beginning of  a more active role for unofficial financial markets. 
In  1965 the  government undertook  a  major interest rate reform.  Some 
authors have cited this as the reason for the dramatic increase in domestic 
(private) savings in the late 1960s.’  However, our analysis of savings in the 
more recent period finds interest rates to be of little importance (see ch. 8). 
This finding is consistent with Giovannini’s (1983) conclusion that interest 
rate elasticities of  savings are small in developing countries and with work 
by van Wijnbergen (1983b). 
At the same time, diplomatic and commercial relations with Japan were 
normalized, generating a renewed inflow of funds which partially substituted 
for the decline in foreign aid from the United States. From 1966 on, for the 
first time commercial banks were allowed to issue foreign loan guarantees, 
and a series of strong incentives were put in place for exporters to invest and 
to borrow abroad. 
To  summarize,  three  critical  developments had  occurred  by  1964-65. 
First,  the  shift  to  export  promotion  as  the  means  to  economic  growth 
elevated capital formation to top priority.  Second, changes in  government 
policy  and  external environment had  set  the  stage for  heavy  reliance on 
external debt as a source of finance. Finally, the five-year plans identified an 
important role for government intervention in  the allocation of  resources, 
setting the stage for government control over (organized) financial markets 
and, therefore, the allocation of  domestic and foreign finance. This was in 
marked contrast to the period prior to 1961 in which the United States played 
the major role in allocating foreign capital inflows. During 1964-65  growth 
of output and exports had resumed, the current account deficit had fallen to a 
manageable 0.3 percent of GNP, and the 1964 devaluation together with real 
wage declines had resulted in a competitive labor force. 
4.1.2  Rapid Growth, 1966-69 
The years  1966-69  were  a period  of  high  growth and  stable inflation. 
However,  increasing  external  imbalance  and  the  rapid  accumulation  of 
external debt presented potential difficulties for the macroeconomy. As  was 
shown in tables 3.1 and 3.3, external debt jumped from $392 million in  1962 
(10.7 percent of GNP) to $1800 million at the end of  1969 (27.2 percent of 
GNP).  Many  factors  facilitated  these  massive  inflows.  On  the  foreign 
lenders’ side, risk was substantially reduced because of  the loan guarantee 187  KoredChapter 4 
system.  In  addition,  many  borrowers received guarantees from their own 
domestic governments. 
Domestic borrowers were  given strong incentives.  In  practice,  applica- 
tions for loans to fund investment in priority  sectors were encouraged and 
usually approved. As discussed in chapter 3, the interest cost of  domestic 
bank loans exceeded the average cost of  borrowing abroad by  14.1 percent 
during  1966-70,  and  loans from the curb market  were considerably more 
expensive. The real private cost to borrowing abroad was -  5.1 percent. At 
a time when domestic bank loans were strictly rationed, the Foreign Capital 
Inducement law in  1966 introduced a more flexible process for foreign loan 
approval. 
Total loan guarantees grew at an average annual rate of 5 percent during 
this period as compared to average growth rates of 30 percent for bank credit 
to the public and private sectors. The foreign capital inflows sustained high 
investment. Nearly 40 percent of  total foreign loans during  1966-70  were 
allocated  to  manufacturing,  with  another  40  percent  to  social  overhead 
investments, 11 percent to agriculture, and 6.5 percent to services. 
Gross fixed investment jumped from less than  15 percent of  GNP in  1965 
to 20 percent in 1966, and then to 26 percent in 1969. As we have already 
seen, 83.8 percent of  the increase in external debt can be accounted for by 
the current account deficit. Reserve accumulation amount to 20.2 percent of 
the increase. 
Three other developments occurred during the period. In 1967 there was a 
liberalization of the trade regime as the government switched from a positive 
to  a  negative  list  for  restricting imports.  Second,  the  Law  for  Fostering 
Capital Markets in  1968 was the first in  a series of  measure to encourage 
public borrowing. 
It is also important to stress the developing role of financial policies. The 
years 1965-70  were a period of rapid growth of commercial and specialized 
banks. Interest rate subsidies on foreign loans also increased markedly after 
1966. Hong (1979, 260-61)  estimates that tariff exemptions were much less 
important than interest rate subsidies on loans as an incentive for investment. 
4.1.3 
By  1969-70  Korea was faced with four major difficulties. The first was 
the preciptious rise in the burden  of  external debt.  Despite the exemplary 
export performance, the debt service ratio (long term) escalated from 7.8 
percent in  1969 to 18.2 percent in  1970. 
A  second difficulty was that  domestic savings dropped by  3 percent  of 
GNP  between  1969 and  1970.  One  reason  cited  for  the  decline  is  the 
reduction in real interest rates as a result of  increasing overvaluation (Y.  C. 
Park  198%). However, an alternative explanation begins by pointing out that 
the real question may be not  why  saving rates fell in  1970, but why  they 
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were so high in  1969. In  1970 saving rates returned to their  1968 level and 
remained  roughly  constant  for three years.  A sensible  answer  to the latter 
question  is  based  on  the  dramatic  jump  in  real  growth  rates  during 
1968-69.3  Domestic  residents  may  well  have  perceived  these  rates  as 
temporary  so  that  one  would  expect  little  adjustment  of  consumption.  In 
fact, this rationale also helps to explain the  1974 “drop”  in savings to 19.9 
percent  of  GNP.  Savings had jumped from  16.5 percent  of GNP in  1972, 
with a 5.3 percent growth rate, to 22.8 percent in  1973, with a 14.0 percent 
growth rate. 
The third  factor  was  consistently  high  investment  relative  to domestic 
savings.  Although  fixed  investment  declined  slightly  as  a  share of  GNP 
during  1970 and  1971,  inventory  accumulation  jumped  sharply  in  1969, 
remaining high through  1971. Much of the 1969 increase in inventories was 
from  the  accumulation  of  agricultural  products  arising  from  high  grain 
imports  and  from  a  large  rice  harvest.  The  increases  in  1971-72  were 
primarily  in manufactured goods, presumably  in response  to the increasing 
overvaluation and expected depreciation. 
The fourth problem  arose  from  wage  and  exchange  rate  developments. 
During  1966-70  nominal  wages rose by  over  160  percent,  implying a 65 
percent  increase  in  domestic  real  wages.  However,  the nominal  exchange 
rate  (won/$)  depreciated  by  less  than  15  percent.  The  result  was  a 
deterioration in international competitiveness. The extent of the loss depends 
on  which  measure of  labor productivity  is used.  Using  the  KPC measure, 
productivity  rose  by  101.1 percent  during  the  period,  implying  a  14.4 
percent  rise  in  unit  labor  costs  measured  in  dollars.  However,  using  the 
value-added  index,  productivity  grew  much  more  slowly,  implying  a 50.8 
percent increase in dollar unit labor costs. 
A series of adjustments were undertaken beginning in 1970. In accordance 
with an IMF standby arrangement, medium-term loans were strictly limited, 
slowing the growth of external debt. Monetary expansion was also tightened. 
By  1971 a slowdown in economic activity was evident. Real growth rates 
declined as did the  growth  of  imports, particularly  capital  goods  imports, 
resulting  in  a dampening of capital  formation.  Authorities  were reticent to 
pursue  expansionary  monetary  or fiscal  policies  for fear of  worsening  the 
current account. 
In June  1971 the exchange rate was devalued in hopes of expanding  the 
economy, without deteriorating the external balance, by stimulating exports. 
After an  initial  13 percent  devaluation  relative  to the dollar,  the  won  was 
gradually devalued until June 1972 when the exchange rate was fixed at 400 
won/$.  There  were  also  adjustments  of  the  dollar  vis-a-vis  other  major 
currencies  during  1972-73.4  In  real  terms  the  won  depreciated  by  11.9 
percent  during  1970-72  and  by  an  additional  15.6 percent  during  1973. 
Nominal  wage  growth  slowed.  Consequently,  although  unit  labor  costs 
continued to rise when measured in won, when measured in dollars they fell 189  KoredChapter 4 
by  19 percent from 1970 to 1973 using the KPC index, or by  5 percent using 
the value-added index. 
In fact, both monetary and fiscal policies were loosening during 1971-72. 
Two developments contributed to this policy  shift. Agricultural production 
(in particular, food grains) was low throughout 1970-73,  with the yield of 
1971 crops especially disappointing. As a result, there were large deficits in 
the  government's  Grain  Management  Fund  financed  by  domestic  credit 
expansion. 
Second, there was a financial crisis in  1972.'  Because of devaluation and 
export  difficulties,  many  firms  with  foreign  debts  were  forced  close  to 
bankruptcy. To  avoid jeopardizing Korea's  standing in  international credit 
markets,  the  government  elected  to  bail  out  these  firms  from  their 
difficulties. Outstanding guarantees on foreign loans fell in  1972, and few 
new  ones were issued. 
The  government  instituted  measures  to  restrict  the  expansion  of  the 
unofficial financial market. A presidential decree,  announced on 3 August 
1972, is especially notable because it  reversed almost all of  the financial 
liberalizations that had been  instituted since  1965. The decree replaced all 
existing  agreements between  firms  and  unofficial  lenders  with  new  ones 
more favorable to borrowers. For example,  many  short-term, high interest 
loans were replaced by  longer term,  low  interest rate  ones. The measure 
mitigated the difficulties of  many debt-ridden firms and effectively shifted 
adjustment to the financial crisis to the crub market. The unofficial market 
almost disappeared in the aftermath of  the crisis and was not revived until 
after the 1973 jump in oil prices. 
Overall, 1970-78  was a period of  slowed growth of the banking system. 
Emphasis was placed  on  the partially regulated nonbank  financial  institu- 
tions,  especially  investment  and  finance  corporations,  which  were  given 
incentives and encouraged to grow. 
In 1972 inflation accelerated and real growth slowed even further, despite 
improved export  performance and  the more  expansionary macroeconomic 
policies. The primary factors seem to have been, on the demand side, a drop 
in private consumption, and on the supply side, poor performance in services 
and  manufacturing  as  well  as  agriculture.  On  the  brighter  side,  the 
substantial  improvement  in  the  current  account  position  is  primarily 
attributable to export growth and not to a contraction of imports. To  further 
encourage  investment  the  government  took  a  more  active  role.  On  12 
October 1972 explicit priority sectors were introduced for the inducement of 
foreign investments.'j 
Nineteen seventy-three was  an extremely favorable year for the Korean 
economy.  Exports  and  GNP  boomed.  The  debt  situation  improved.  The 
current account deficit relative to GNP fell even further, as domestic saving 
rates  soared. There was  some decline in  inflation, and  the growth in  real 
wages resumed, exceeding the rise in labor productivity. 190  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
Why  was  1973 such  a  good  year? Three  factors  were  the  very  strong 
world  economy,  the  lagged  impact of  real  depreciation and  expansionary 
macroeconomic policies,  and  the favorable private  savings outturn.  How- 
ever, an important point is that Korea avoided more substantial macroeco- 
nomic  stabilization measures because of  its history of  well-placed invest- 
ments which enabled it to resume the high growth rates of the 1960s as soon 
as favorable external conditions returned. 
4.1.4 
We  end this section by asking whether the 1973 boom signified a complete 
recovery  from  the  problems  which  emerged  during  the  early  1970% or 
whether underlying weaknesses remained.  There  is considerable evidence 
(high  and  growing  investment  with  high  rates  of  return,  rising  labor 
productivity, a competitive real exchange rate) that it would be difficult to 
dispute the very favorable prospects for rapid continued growth. Certainly, 
this was one important strength. 
However, some aspects of Korea’s structure left the economy particularly 
sensitive to unfavorable external developments. Investment rates targeted in 
the economic growth plans exceeded realistic forecasts of domestic savings. 
The  high  investment  and  shifting  economic  structure  implied  increasing 
dependence on imports of raw materials and capital goods. Furthermore, GNP 
growth was closely linked to the growth in world demand for Korean exports. 
Difficulties emerged when  savings fell relative to investment. Given the 
high fixed investment, the problem was overly variable saving and inventory 
behavior.  The  larger  current  account  deficit  required  additional  external 
borrowing,  increasing  the  burden  of  debt.  The  problem  could  then  be 
exacerbated by  external  factors,  namely  higher  interest rates  or  a  world 
recession which slowed the growth of  exports. It could also be exacerbated 
by  internal  factors  such  as  a  rise  in  the  (planned)  capital  formation 
component of  investment. With variations, these are exactly the elements of 
both the second and the third crises. 
From this perspective, it is sensible to ask whether Korea would have been 
better off overall by choosing somewhat smaller investment targets. Potential 
advantages would  have  been  a  reduction in  the  sensitivity to  unexpected 
internal and  external developments. With  a  smaller trend  current account 
deficit and less accumulation of external debt, the economy might have been 
able to weather a jump in inventories or a drop in savings. 
However,  this  view  is  misleading.  As  we  argue  in  chapter  7,  foreign 
borrowing  contributed  significantly to  the  growth  of  output.  A  ballpark 
estimate is that the economy would have grown only half as quickly during 
1961  -71  without the external finance, and only two-thirds as quickly during 
1972-76.  Frank,  Kim,  and Westphal (1975) reach similar conclusions in 
their estimates of the costs of lower investment. It is economically sensible 
for an economy with very profitable investment opportunities to supplement 
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domestic  savings  with  external  funds.  During  1962-72  Korea  very 
successfully encouraged industries for export-oriented growth. 
4.2  The Second Period of Rapid Debt Accumulation, 1974-78 
We  turn next to the second period of difficulty, 1974-75,  and subsequent 
recovery, 1976-78.  Just as in the first episode, this period coincides with a 
major  shift in  economic policy  and  a significant increase in  fixed capital 
formation. 
At  the beginning of  the  1970s, Korean policymakers saw  a decline in 
competitiveness which they felt necessitated further structural shifts in order 
to maintain future growth prospects. They felt that the rising real wages and 
capital intensity in manufacturing undermined Korea’s ability to compete in 
light manufacturing and signaled a shift in its comparative advantage toward 
higher skill-intensive and technology-intensive products. The U.S. decision 
to reduce the number of  troops stationed in  Korea reinforced the desire of 
policymakers  to  invest  more  heavily  in  defense.  As  a  consequence,  a 
massive investment program was  initiated  in  1973 to  develop heavy  and 
chemical (HC) industries. The program remained in effect through 1979. 
A primary difference between the second period of rapid debt accumula- 
tion and  the first is that,  in  addition to internal factors, the economy was 
forced to adjust to unfavorable external developments-the  jump in oil prices 
followed by  the slowdown in  world activity. 
The major facts to be explained are as follows. During 1974-75 there was 
a drop in real growth rates, a jump in inflation, and a substantial increase in 
external borrowing. During 1976-78,  however, Korea was able to resume 
its high growth rates and to improve its debt position. In addition, there was 
some reduction in inflation at first (1976-77),  but a resurgence in 1978. 
Section 4.2.1 examines the  period of  poor  performance, assessing the 
relative importance of  internal and external factors. Section 4.2.2 turns to 
the recovery period and to a discussion of  the strengths and weaknesses of 
the  economy in  1978, the threshold to the third  and  most  serious crisis. 
Throughout the discussion, we refer to the economic indicators in table 4.2. 
4.2.1  The Problem Years, 1974-75 
Table  4.2  shows  that  economic performance deteriorated in  1974. By 
Latin American standards, the outturn, with its real growth rate in excess of 
8 percent, can hardly be called a crisis. But Korean policymakers were quite 
concerned about the developments. 
The growth rate dropped by  nearly 40 percent.  Inflation surged to 24.3 
percent. Even more striking was the unprecedented increase in  the current 
account deficit, which jumped  from 2.3  percent to  10.8 percent of  GNP 
within one year. External debt grew by  37 percent from $4.3 to $5.9 billion. 
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Table 4.2  Major Economic Indicators, 1973-78 
1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978 
GNP growth rate  14. I  8.5  6.8  13.4  10.7  11.0 
Export growth rate  98.6  38.3  13.9  51.8  30.2  26.5 
Inflation (CPI)  3.1  24.3  25.3  15.3  10. I  14.4 
Current account (% GNP)  -  2.3  -  10.8  -9.1  -1.1  0.0  -2.1 
Fixed investment (% GNP)  23.2  25.6  25.3  24.4  27.3  31.3 
Domesitc  savingsiCNP  22.8  19.9  19.1  23.9  27.5  28.5 
M2  growth rate  36.6  24.0  28.2  33.5  39.7  35.0 
Budget deficiUGNP  1.6  4.0  4.6  2.9  2.6  2.5 
Growth rates: 
Nominal wages  18.0  35.3  27.0  34.7  33.8  34.3 
Real wages  14.3  8.8  1.4  16.8  21.5  17.4 
Labor productivity 
Value added  5.0  2.4  2.2  2.4  10.3  12.6 
KPC index’  8.8  11.4  11.6  7.5  10.5  11.9 
Terms of  trade  136.2  110.9  100.0  114.1  122.0  127.9 
Won/$  398.3  404.5  484.0  484.0  484.0  484.0 
Redl effective exchange rate  117.1  101.1  100.0  93.6  94.6  97.8 
Source:  Economic Planning Board and Bank of Korea. 
Note:  Based on  new SNA method 
‘From Korea Productivity Center, output per production worker. 
percent.  The debt  service  ratio  fell  slightly  to  14.4 percent,  substantially 
below its  197 1 level of 2 1 percent.  More worrisome developments were the 
rise in the share of short-term debt to nearly 21 percent. It is noteworthy that 
all of  this rise was in loans to the banking sector. Unlike short-term loans to 
the private  sector, which fell between  1973 and  1974, these  “accommodat- 
ing”  capital  inflows  can  be  considered  unplanned.  Total  long-term  loans 
grew more slowly during 1974 than they had during 1973, again except for a 
jump in long-term loans to the banking sector. 
Referring to the decompositions given in chapter 7, poor performance  in 
construction  and  manufacturing  accounts  for a 4 percent  decline  in  GNP 
growth, with most of the rest due to slower growth of other services. On the 
demand side, most of  the slowdown is attributable to exports. 
The  jump  in  inflation  is  not  surprising.  Domestic  credit  expansion 
averaged  35  percent  during  1972-73  compared  to only  24 percent  during 
1970-71.  There was also a large shock from external price increases (Korea 
imports oil as well as primary commodities).  Unit import prices rose by 55 
percent  between  1973 and  1974.  In  addition,  nominal  wages  rose  by  35 
percent (a real wage gain of  8.8 percent), while labor productivity increases 
amounted to less than  12 percent (less than 3 percent using the value-added 
index).  The rapid  nominal  wage  growth  has been  attributed to tight  labor 
markets  in  the  mid  1970s, as the  Big  Push  created  an excess  demand  for 
many types of skilled labor. 193  KoredChapter 4 
The counterpart to  the  current account deficit  was  increased fixed  and 
inventory investment combined with a drop in savings (relative to output). 
The rise  in  fixed  capital formation was  to  be  expected given  the  shift in 
development strategy. As an indication of the magnitudes of the shifts during 
the  early  seventies,  it  is  interesting to  compare the  sectoral allocation of 
loans. Although the share of total foreign loans which went to manufacturing 
fell  slightly  from  39.8  percent  during  1966-70  to  38.8  percent  during 
1971  -75,  the percentage of these going to HC industries rose from 57 to 68 
percent.  Most  of  this  increase is  accounted for  by  changes  in  allocation 
during  1973-75.  It  is also likely  that  investment in  HC industries during 
197 1-75  was  concentrated  in  1974,  because  investors  anticipated  a 
devaluation  in  the  wake  of  the  first  oil  shock  that  did  not  occur  until 
December 1974. 
It is interesting that fixed capital formation grew more quickly during the 
third five-year plan (1972-76)  than had been targeted: 13.2 vs. 7.6 percent. 
Part  of  the  explanation  for  this  may  be  the  increase  in  investment 
expenditures  on  residential  construction  between  1973 and  1974  which 
accounted  for  nearly  half  of  the  increased  fixed  capital  formation,  the 
remainder being  attributed primarily to an increase in  investment expendi- 
tures on transport equipment. 
A second factor was the decline in domestic savings. Y.  C.  Park (1985c, 
304) writes that  “mostly  as  a reflection of  the short-run difficulty  in  the 
adjustment of  consumption to a lower real  income,  and of  a high  rate  of 
inflation, domestic savings as a fraction of  GNP plunged by four percentage 
points to  19% in  1975 from about 23% in  1973.” Other authors also argue 
that the large unexpected drop in  savings was a major cause of  the crisis. 
However, as discussed above, the high saving rate in  1973 was more out of 
line than the lower one in 1974. The 1974 rate exceeded the average rate of 
16  percent  during  the  less  inflationary  period,  1968-72,  and  remained 
approximately constant through 1975. The main reason for the jump in  1973 
seems to have been the unexpectedly rapid real growth. 
From a planner’s perspective, the more surprising outturn must have been 
the unprecedented jump in inventory investment. Eighty percent of the 1974 
increase came from accumulation of manufactures (including capital goods) 
and raw  materials.  The  large increases can be  partially  explained by  the 
combination of  an  imminent  expected  depreciation  and  an  unanticipated 
reduction in export growth. (Y.C. Park 1985c, 304). 
It  is  also  useful  to  identify  the  components  of  the  current  account 
deterioration. A little over 20 percent of  the increased deficit came from a 
worsening in the invisibles balance, primarily due to increased payments for 
transport  and  investment  income.  Eighty  percent  came  from  the  trade 
balance. There was the expected surge in imports. However, only 26 percent 
of the jump is accounted for by  oil payments. Another 26 percent was from 
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imports. Payments for imports rose not only because of  the price hike, but 
also because  of  a  rise  in  the  volume  of  imports.  At  the  same time,  the 
growth  of  export  receipts  slowed  relative  to  1972-73,  returning  to  the 
average  1966-72  performance.  While  the  world  recession  caused  a 
reduction in the total volume of exports, the unit value of exports jumped by 
27 percent between 1973 and 1974, dampening the deterioration in Korea’s 
terms of  trade. 
To  summarize the 1974 experience, Korean export growth was slowed by 
a combination of  the oil  and commodity price rise and the ensuing world 
recession. Slower export growth, in conjunction with the Big Push toward 
HC industries resulted in a jump in investment (fixed capital formation and 
especially inventories of  imported capital goods and intermediates). At  the 
same time, saving rates fell from their high level in the boom year of  1973. 
The result was an enormous current account deficit. The jump in  inflation 
rates came both from higher oil prices and from rapid nominal wage growth. 
We  return to a discussion of  the relative importance of  internal and external 
developments in chapter 5. 
The year  1974 was the beginning of  the Big  Push toward promotion of 
heavy industries. The decision was made to continue this effort, borrowing 
to finance the required imports instead of  contracting the economy to adjust 
to  external shocks. BOK  secured loans for the banking sector. Taxes were 
raised  to  conserve  oil  consumption.  Unlike  the  response  in  many  other 
developing  countries,  domestic oil  prices  were  increased.  The  predeposit 
requirement on imports was  also raised.  At  the same time,  incentives for 
exporters came from lowered  interest rates and expanded access to export 
credits. 
In December the won was devalued from 400 to 484 won/$, a rate which 
prevailed until January 1980. The devaluation resulted in a 7.2 percent real 
depreciation of the won relative to its average 1972-73  level. However, unit 
labor costs in dollars rose by  about 4 percent during  1972-74  because of 
large nominal wage gains. 
Finally,  the  National  Investment Fund  (NIF) was  created  in  1974. Its 
purpose was to generate additional domestic savings and to channel them to 
targeted  sectors and  projects consistent with  the development plan.  More 
specifically,  it  was  to  mobilize  employee pension  funds.  In  encouraging 
banks  to  make  preferential  loans,  the  policy  marked  the  beginning  of 
additional government  intervention  in  the  financial  sector  through  credit 
allocation. As a share of  bank credit, preferential loans were to grow from 
40 percent  in  1971 to  55  percent in  1976-77,  and then  to 70 percent in 
1978. It  is  interesting that  the  interest rate  incentives to borrow  abroad 
actually declined during  1971-75  relative to  1966-70  because of  higher 
foreign rates, the depreciation, and a decline in domestic bank loan rates (see 
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limited.  The  real  cost  of  borrowing  abroad  remained  negative,  -  1.6 
percent. 
Overall, the situation deteriorated during 1975. The outcome was slightly 
better in terms of inflation and the current account deficit, but both remained 
extremely high.  There was  some  furhter slowdown  in  real  growth.  The 
situation was  much  worse in terms of  external debt.  Korea borrowed an 
additional  $2.5  billion,  escalating  the  debt-GNP  ratio  to  40  percent. 
Although  the  debt  service ratio remained  at  14.4 percent,  the  share  of 
short-term debt to the total jumped from 20.9 percent to 28.5 percent.  In 
marked contrast to 1974, 64  percent of the rise in short-term debt went to the 
private sector, with only 46 percent going to “accommodating” bank loans. 
Similarly, most of the rise in long-term debt went to the public or the private 
sectors. 
The counterpart to  the  current  account improvement was  a  decline in 
inventory accumulation. This portion of investment remained high, although 
the accumulation was concentrated primarily in agricultural, not manufactur- 
ing, products. Fixed capital formation rose somewhat, and there was a slight 
further decline in the saving ratio. 
The trade balance  improved somewhat, primarily because of  the small 
increase in the value of imports. In particular there was a substantial decline 
in the imports of  manufactures, offsetting further increases in the prices of 
capital goods and oil. 
It is not surprising that inflation remained relatively high as the impact of 
the  December  1974 devaluation  filtered  into  domestic  prices.  However, 
nominal wage growth slowed somewhat to 27 percent, with the increase in 
labor productivity growth remaining constant. With no additional external 
shocks  and  with  a  sustained  moderation  in  wage  growth  relative  to 
productivity, inflation rates would have been expected to drop further during 
1976-77.  One sign pointing in  this direction was the declining growth of 
wholesale prices-26.5  percent in  1975 compared to 42.1 percent in  1974. 
The high inflation in 1974-75 was in large part a one-shot reaction to the oil 
price shock and devaluation. This perspective, combined with labor market 
developments, makes the  rapid  decline in  inflation during  1976-78  less 
surprising. Fiscal policy continued to be expansionary, financed primarily by 
external borrowing. Thus, during 1975 there was no significant change in 
domestic saving. Furthermore, the  1974 depreciation did  not  succeed  in 
reviving exports, primarily because of  stagnant world demand, rising unit 
labor costs, and the resulting decline in competitiveness. 
In summary, three major problems characterized 1974-75.  The first was a 
slowdown in growth of exports and GNP. The second was an unsustainable 
current account deficit and the implied rapid accumulation of  external debt. 
Current account deficits during these two years accounted for 93 percent of 
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shift to short-term borrowing. Finally, policymakers were concerned about 
the high rates of inflation. 
4.2.2  Recovery, 1976-78 
Table 4.2 shows the rapid recovery which began in 1976. Growth rates of 
GNP and exports surged to  14 percent and 51 percent, respectively, while 
inflation  continued  to  decline.  Most  striking  is  the  drop  in  the  current 
account deficit from 9.1 percent in 1975 to 1.1 percent within one year, and 
to  0.0  percent  in  1977.  This  section  examines  how  these  dramatic 
improvements came about. It concludes with a discussion of the state of the 
Korean economy in 1978, the year before the severe 1979-80  crisis. 
The current account improvement during 1976-77  is attributable to a rise 
in  domestic savings  as  a  share of  income and  to  a  decline  in  inventory 
investment. On the other side, very rapid export growth, fueled by the 1974 
devaluation and  the  recovery  in  world  demand,  contributed to  an  export 
boom during 1976. Korea was also beginning to enjoy growing receipts from 
construction activity in the Middle East. 
Thus, we  can identify four factors which  explain how  Korea’s current 
account deficits recovered so quickly. One factor is the strong recovery  in 
world demand which stimulated demand for Korean exports. A second is the 
increased fixed capital formation which expanded potential export produc- 
tion.  Exports of  chemicals plus  machinery  and  transport equipment grew 
from  14 percent  to  24  percent  of  total  exports  between  1973 and  1978.7 
Third, the large increases in  savings, attributable primarily to rapid income 
growth, enabled Korea to finance the bulk of  its investment domestically by 
1976. 
Finally,  by  1978  the  negative  impact  of  higher  oil  prices  had  been 
dampened considerably by  the inflows from construction in the Middle East. 
Oil  payments  had  averaged $0.3 billion per  year  during  1972-73,  while 
construction revenues had  averaged  $0.014  billion.  During  1974-78,  oil 
payments and  construction revenues  totaled $5.8 billion and $3.9 billion, 
respectively, so that 90 percent of the additional oil payments were offset by 
additional foreign exchange inflows from construction. 
It is important to stress that  substantial capital inflows continued during 
this recovery period. External debt increased by  approximately $2 billion in 
each of the three years. The real cost of foreign borrowing remained negative 
during  1975-78.  There  was  relatively  easy  access  to  foreign  credit, 
including  import  financing  and  prepayment  of  exports.  Domestic  bank 
credits, however, were subject to increasing restrictions. 
Inflation fell from 29.5 percent in  1975 to 15.7 percent in 1977. As argued 
above, much of  the  1974-75  jump in  inflation should be  interpreted as  a 
one-time adjustment to the terms of trade shock and to devaluation. Given an 
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prices remained stable during 1976-78,  reduced inflation is not surprising. 
The two issues which do warrant explanation are, first, that inflation did not 
decline by  more and, second, that it was reignited during 1978. 
Two factors help  to  explain  why  inflation  rates  did  not  fall below  15 
percent: rapid wage inflation and rapid monetary expansion. Nominal wages 
increased by  142 percent between  1975 and  1978, while consumer prices 
and labor productivity rose by  only 45 percent and 33 percent, respectively. 
As  will  be  argued  in  chapter  10,  the  wage  growth  was  fueled  by  an 
increasingly tight domestic labor market. In particular, the combination of 
the accelerating demand for labor from the Big Push and the reduced supply 
of  skilled labor for foreign construction projects pushed up wages in some 
sectors,  filtering  across  to  wages  elsewhere  in  the  economy.  The  wage 
growth together with a fixed nominal exchange rate implied a deteriorating 
competitiveness  of  Korean  workers  relative  to  the  country’s  major 
competitors-Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  and  Taiwan.  It  is  noteworthy, 
however, that existing data points to a deteriorating distribution of  income 
during the late 1970s, following two decades of continued improvement. 
The monetary expansion arose both from domestic credit expansion and 
from  the  foreign  sector.  The  continued  capital  inflows  and  growing  net 
foreign asset position has been mentioned above. In addition, large deficits 
in the Grain Management Fund were financed through money creation. In an 
effort  to  promote  self-sufficiency,  the  price  at  which  the  government 
purchased rice grew 30 percent more rapidly than the price at which the rice 
was sold during 1975-78. 
The government became increasingly concerned about domestic inflation. 
During the late  1970s, a variety of  price controls, ceilings, and guidelines 
proliferated.  Prices  in  monopolistic  and  oligopolistic  industries  were 
controlled  by  the  government,  which  authorized  all  increases.  As  the 
industrial concentration grew,  these controls accounted for an  increasingly 
large share of  the CPI. In  addition, the prices of  many essential products 
were monitored by the government. 
Nam claims that government pricing policies led to many problems during 
the late  1970s (1984). The “stop-go”  approach to allowing price increases 
created  supply  shortages,  declining product  quality, reduced investments, 
and  distorted  resource  allocation  during  a  time  of  substantial  structural 
readjustment. Black markets for some essential consumer goods emerged. 
There is  a general consensus that  1975-78  was  a period  of  increasing 
misallocation of  resources and increasing industrial concentration. Seventy- 
seven percent of  all investment in  equipment in the manufacturing sector 
went  to  HC  industries,  although  these  industries  accounted  for  only  55 
percent of  total production. 
The chaeboE-large-scale  industrial conglomerates-became  a significant 
share of  the business sector in the mid-1970s. Although they participate in 
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chemical manufacturing. Statistics are difficult to obtain, however Jones and 
Sakong  (1980,  304)  provide  estimates  for  1975 which  suggest  that  the 
forty-six largest chaebol produced 37 percent of value added in manufactur- 
ing and  13 percent in GNP,  and that business concentration was increasing 
rapidly. Westphal (1984) states that by 
1980-81,  the list of  officially recognized chaebol had  26 large groups, 
which together controlled 465 firms. Eight of these, along with two public 
conglomerates, appear on Fortune’s 1980 list of  the 500 largest industrial 
corporations outside of  the United States. One, the Hyundai Group, was 
the  largest  nonpetroleum  corporation  resident  in  the  less  developed 
countries. 
Financial  and  trade  policies  also  became  more  restrictive  during  this 
period (see ch. 9 and  11). Financial market restrictions increased and credit 
rationing was tightened, with preference given to HC industries and to large 
firms. Extremely high corporate debt-equity ratios contributed to the fragility 
of the banking sector-in  the manufacturing sector, the debt-equity ratio rose 
from an already high 3.16 in  1974 to 3.77 in 1979, and then to 4.88 in  1980. 
(It would fall to 3.86 by  1982, following a massive bailout and the growth of 
Korean stock markets.) 
By  1978 the economic situation looked somewhat less promising. Growth 
rates declined further. The current account deficit reemerged. This time, the 
increase  was  attributable to  increased  fixed  capital  formation.  Domestic 
savings continued to rise as a share of  income. There was also a jump  in 
inflation.  On  the  positive  side,  the  debt  of  GNP  ratio  declined,  with  a 
reduction in the share of  short-term debt. 
Thus, a number of structural weaknesses faced the Korean economy at the 
beginning of  1979. The major ones were the recurrent imbalance between 
investment and domestic savings, growing fragility of financial markets, and 
increased government intervention in trade, the financial sector, and pricing. 
Furthermore, the Big Push to HC industries contributed to a misallocation of 
domestic resources and to excess capacity in these sectors. 
4.3  The Third Period of Crisis and Recovery, 1979-86 
The  final  period  of  major  debt  accumulation,  crisis,  and  recovery  is 
perhaps the most interesting. It was certainly the most severe, including one 
year  (1980)  in  which  output  declined  by  nearly  5  percent.  By  1983, 
however,  high  growth  had  resumed,  combined  with  substantial improve- 
ments in inflation and external balance. 
Korea’s impressive performance stands in marked contrast to the majority 
of heavily indebted countries, which continue to struggle in the aftermath of 
multiple  painful  external  shocks  since  1979.  The  rapid  and  sustained 
turnaround  in  Korea’s economic performance has  been  widely  cited  as  a 
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outcomes  from  the  correct  application  of  macroeconomic  stabilization 
policies. 
For  Korea in  this period, as in  the two earlier episodes and just as for 
many other countries, internal developments combined with external ones to 
create the economic crisis. By  1979 Korea was again in the midst of  a shift 
in  the  government's  fundamental economic  strategy.  Performance during 
1974-78 had convinced policymakers to step back from the Big Push, with 
its reliance on  widespread government intervention, and  to  refocus  from 
viewing  industrial policy  as  a tool  to  promote rapid economic growth to 
having a growing concern about price stability as a necessary precondition to 
continued growth. The policy  shift was  confounded by  increasing  social 
unrest, the assassination of  President Park, and agricultural disasters during 
1978-80.  On net,  complicated interactions between internal and  external 
factors make  it extremely  difficult to  identify  the  relative importance of 
particular elements in  explaining outcomes. We  return  to these issues  in 
chapter 5. 
The  discussion is  divided  into  four  remaining  sections.  Section 4.3.1 
discusses the policy shift embodied in the 1979 Comprehensive Stabilization 
Plan  (CSP). Section 4.3.2 examines the  1979-80  crisis period.  Sections 
4.3.3 and 4.3.4 analyze the early recovery period from 1981 to 1983 and the 
strong performance period, 1983-86.  Throughout the discussion, we refer to 
the economic indicators in table 4.3. 
Table 4.3  Major Economic Indicators, 1978-86 
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  I984  1985  1986P 
GNP growth rate 
Export growth rate 
Inflation (CPI) 
Current account (% GNP) 
Fixed investment (% GNP) 
Domestic savings (% GNP) 
M2  growth rate 





Value  added 
KPC index' 
Terms of trade 
Real effective exchange rate 
Won/$ 
11.0  7.0 
26.5  18.4 
14.4  18.3 
-2.1  -6.8 
31.3  33.2 
28.5  28.1 
35.0  24.6 
2.5  1.4 
-4.8  6.6 
16.3  21.4 
28.7  21.3 
-8.8  -7.0 
32.3  28.7 
23.5  23.5 
26.9  25.0 
3.2  4.7 
5.4  11.9 
2.8  11.9 
7.2  3.4 
-3.8  -2.1 
30.5  31.3 
24.0  27.9 
27.0  15.2 









5.4  12.5 
3.6  14.6 
2.5  2.3 
-1.1  4.9 
30.8  31.3 
30.7  34.8 
15.6  18.6 
1.0  1.8 
34.3  28.6 
17.4  8.7 
12.6  16.0 
11.9  15.9 
117.8  115.3 
109.0  97.2 
484.0  484.0 
22.7  20.1 
-4.7  -2.6 
-3.9  11.1 
10.6  18.1 
100.0  97.9 
100.0  103.6 
607.4  681.0 
14.7  12.2 
6.9  10.4 
-  1.8  4.2 
7.8  13.6 
102.2  103.1 
103.2  110.6 








9.9  9.1 
7.3  6.7 
-0.8  7.6 
7.1  13.6 
105.9  114.7 
121.2  139.2 
870.0  881.5 
Source:  Economic Planning Board and Bank of  Korea. 
Note:  Based on new SNA method. 
'From Korea Productivity Center, output per production worker. 
PPreliminary. 200  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
4.3.1  Policy Refocus,  1977-79 
As government concern over persistently  high inflation grew, policymak- 
ers began  to reassess the approach embodied  in the  Big Push. A  series of 
measures  were  introduced.  During  1977  these  included  restraints  on 
monetary  and  fiscal  expansion  to contain  aggregate  demand. The govern- 
ment  also  attempted  to  eliminate  shortages  through  improvements  in  the 
distribution system  (in particular,  for  agricultural products),  increases  in  a 
number of  controlled prices,  and acceleration of import liberalization. 
Additional measures were undertaken during 1978. On the rnonetary/fiscal 
side,  short-term  trade  credits  were  discouraged  in  an  effort to reduce  the 
contribution  of  the  foreign  sector  to  monetary  expansion.  Ceilings  were 
placed  on  credit  to  the  private  sector.  Interest  rates  on  bank  loans  and 
deposits  were  increased  as  part  of  a  nationwide  savings  campaign.  In 
addition,  it  was  hoped  that  the  August  1978 Comprehensive  Measure  to 
Curb Speculative Real Estate Investment would shift savings from real assets 
to the banking  sector. Government  spending was  reduced,  in part through 
deferment of construction projects.  On the trade side, the import liberaliza- 
tion ratio was raised  and tariff rates on some imported raw  materials were 
adjusted so as to absorb increasing prices.  Limitations were imposed on the 
exports of  some items with domestic shortages. 
The CSP was announced in April  1979. This plan has been described as a 
“landmark”  (Nam 1984) because it was the first of its kind to put control of 
inflation as the number one priority.  In the past,  the  government  had  been 
primarily  concerned about investment for growth and had consistently been 
willing  to  use  external  and/or  internal  credit  to  finance  real  expansion, 
despite  any  unfavorable  implications  for  price  stability.  Furthermore,  the 
CSP  stated  that  pervasive  government  intervention  to  direct  economic 
development was appropriate in the early stages, but argued that it was also 
appropriate to rely increasingly on market forces at later stages. As such, the 
government  accepted  part  of  the  blame  for existing  economic  difficulties. 
The  new  approach,  which  combined  proposals  from  BOK,  the  Korea 
Development Institute (KDI), and the Economic and Scientific Council, was 
strongly supported by a newly appointed deputy prime minister, Shin Hyon 
Whak. 
The CSP had  four  major  components.  The first  was  a  more  restrictive 
monetary  policy,  including  improvements  in  the  preferential  loan  system, 
and  increased  interest  rates.  Second,  fiscal  policy  was  to  be  contracted 
through  a 5-percentage-point  cut  in spending  and  additional  deferments  of 
large  public  investment  projects.  Third, the  policy  stepped  back  from  the 
focus on  HC  industries by  calling  for a reallocation  of  investment  toward 
other manufacturing  and nonmanfacturing  sectors.  Finally,  the  government 
redoubled  its efforts to  prevent  real  estate  speculation  and  to  increase  the 
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4.3.2  The Crisis,  1979-80 
Macroeconomic performance deteriorated during 1979. Output and export 
growth  rates  continued  their  decline.  Inflation  rates  remained  high.  The 
current account deficit jumped to 2.2 percent of GNP, while external debt rose 
by  $5.5 billion to 32.5 percent of GNP. It was a year of increasing domestic 
unrest.  Partially in  response to worsening income distribution,  there were a 
number  of  demonstrations.  The  situation  culminated  in  the  widespread 
political uncertainties following the death of President Park in October. 
Macroeconomic  policies  were  relatively  contractionary  during  1979. 
Money  growth  was  kept  within  the  CSP’s  targets,  and  government 
expenditures fell relative to GNP, leading to a reduction in the fiscal deficit. 
The counterpart  to the larger current account deficit was a jump in fixed 
and inventory  investment.  Savings remained  high.  As was the  story during 
1974-75,  unanticipated  slowdown  of  export  and  output  growth  helps  to 
explain the inventory jump and subsequent external imbalance. 
A  large trade  deficit  accounts for most  of  the current  account  deteriora- 
tion.  Higher import prices  led to a substantial rise in the value of imports, 
while export receipts stagnated. Increasing real appreciation and labor costs 
help to explain the poor export performance.  Between  1978 and  1979, the 
real exchange rate appreciated by 9 percent, while unit labor costs rose by  11 
percent.  Nominal  wages,  real  wages,  and  labor productivity  grew  by  29 
percent,  9  percent,  and  16  percent,  respectively,  marking  an  end  to  the 
1976-78  period  of  real  wage  gains  in  excess  of  productivity  and  the 
beginning of a period of restrained nominal wage gains. Cumulatively, unit 
labor  costs  more  than  doubled  during  1975-79,  while  the  exchange rate 
remained fixed. 
We  look  next  at  the  declining  growth  rates.  A  simple  accounting 
decomposition on the demand side (see ch. 7) shows that, although there was 
a  massive  (7 percent)  reduction  in  the  contribution  of  exports to growth 
between  1978  and  1979, this  decline  was  offset  by  the  extremely  slow 
growth of imports. The net contribution of trade to growth remained roughly 
constant between  1978 and 1979. On the other hand, the drop in the growth 
of  fixed  investment  was  only  partially  offset  by  inventory  accumulation. 
Total  investment  contributed  a  full  3  percent  to  the  reduction  in  growth 
between  1978 and  1979. 
However,  this  simple  approach  underestimates  the  total  effects  from 
external developments  because  it  ignores resulting  changes in endogenous 
variables. Our counterfactual examples using the KDI Quarterly Macroeco- 
nomic  model  of  the  Korean  economy  (see  ch.  5)  imply  that  with  no 
deterioration in external conditions (i.e., with unchanged oil prices, foreign 
prices, foreign growth rates,  and interest rates),  Korean growth would have 
been  considerably  stronger  (9 percent  in  1979) while  the  current  account 
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Nineteen eighty was a crisis year for the Korean economy. Real output 
declined by  4.8  percent.  Inflation  reached  over  25  percent.  The  current 
account deficit rose to 8.7 percent of GNP. External debt jumped from 32.9 
percent of  GNP at the end of  1979 to 44.7 percent by  the end of  1980. 
Again, there were both internal and external reasons for the 1980 outturn. 
There were two major internal developments. First, the death of  President 
Park  created a climate of  political uncertainty and  social unrest  which  is 
difficult to  quantify.  The  second  arose from the  agricultural sector. After 
poor  grain harvests in  both  1978 and  1979, the rice crop failed in  1980. 
Grain  imports  increased  substantially  during  this  period.  The  sector’s 
contribution to total GNP growth was  -3.4  percent in  1980. In contrast, 
agriculture’s  annual  contribution to  growth  had  ranged  from  0.8  to  2.3 
percent during 197  1-77. 
External factors included the terms  of  trade deterioration following the 
second oil shock (there was a 17 percent decline between  1978 and  1981), 
the slowdown in world economic activity, and the increased cost of servicing 
the  external  debt  due  to  the  rise  in  interest  rates.  Referring  again  to 
simulations from  the  KDI  Quarterly  model,  our  results  suggest  that  if 
external  conditions  had  not  deteriorated,  real  growth  would  have  been 
positive (5 percent) and the current account deficit would have been only half 
as large (as improvement of  $2.7 billion). 
Three factors contributed to the inflation: devaluation, the oil price jump, 
and  the  gradual decontrol of  prices.  The  model  simulations suggest that 
inflation would have been about 9 percentage points lower in the absence of 
the unfavorable external developments. 
A stabilization package was  initiated in  January  1980, supported  by  a 
two-year IMF standby arrangement. The exchange rate was devalued by  17 
percent, and at the same time,  a more flexible exchange rate regime was 
introduced  in  which  the  won-dollar exchange  rate  was  to  be  determined 
based on external conditions and  on  the  value  of  a basket  of  currencies. 
During  1980, the  (trade weighted) nominal  exchange rate  depreciated by 
18.9 percent  in  nominal  terms  and  9.7 percent  in  real  terms.  Domestic 
interest rates, bank loans, and deposits were increased 5-6  percent and the 
higher oil prices were passed through to domestic  consumer^.^ 
The plan also called for a tightening of monetary and fiscal policy, in the 
hopes  of  counteracting  the  inflationary  impact  of  devaluaton.  However, 
conditions deteriorated during the year. Employment and output stagnated, 
student demonstrations and labor unrest increased in the spring, and firms 
were having severe difficulties meeting their debt obligations as a result of 
the  devaluation and  the  economic recession.  The  high  debt-equity ratios 
contributed to the precarious financial situation. 
In response the government relaxed monetary and fiscal policy in a series 
of  measures in June, September, and November. In June, interest rates were 
raised 1-2  percent and domestic credit was expanded, particularly to small 
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Government expenditures on social services were increased, and the target 
money  growth  rates  were  raised  slightly. The  September  and  November 
measures  reduced  selected  taxes  and  the  interest  rates  on  loans,  and 
expanded credit for residential construction. 
4.3.3  Early Recovery, 198  1 -  83 
Korea had  weathered  the two previous crises by  borrowing extensively 
and smoothing the adjustment instead of contracting the economy. However, 
policymakers were skeptical about the feasibility of  this option. Their debt 
stock was already very  large and prospects for a quick recovery of  world 
demand for Korean exports looked dim. Instead, macroeconomic stabiliza- 
tion especially a reduction in inflation rates, remained the top priority. 
The  fifth  five-year  plan,  formulated  in  1981,  launched  a  major  new 
stabilization effort. It gave first priority to reducing inflation. In response to 
dissatisfaction with the role of  government intervention in  the unfavorable 
economic performance, second priority  was given to  economic liberaliza- 
tion. As will be discussed further in chapters 9 and 11, the trade regime has 
since been liberalized substantially, while liberalization of domestic financial 
markets has proceeded more slowly. 
The program included a wide variety of  measures. Tax  reforms reduced 
individual income  taxes,  extended  the  value-added  tax,  and  restructured 
corporate taxes,  eliminating many special advantages. Price controls were 
eliminated. The number  of  restricted imports  was  reduced as part  of  the 
trade liberalization. 
Again,  the actual restrictiveness of  macroeconomic policies varied  as a 
number of  additional measures were undertaken during the year.  In  April, 
policy was loosened as additional credit was given to exporters and to small 
and medium-sized firms. In June the government tried to further stimulate 
construction. Interest rates were reduced by  3 percent,  lagging behind  the 
declines in inflation. The government also began  to rely  more heavily on 
incomes policy in an attempt to keep wages down. 
There were some improvements in the state of  the economy during 198  1. 
In  particular,  there  was  a  one-year  turnaround  in  the  growth  rate-the 
economy grew strongly at 6.6 percent. A sectoral decomposition shows that 
agriculture grew  very  strongly  (contributing over  3  percent  to  the  GNP 
growth rate  as compared to  -3  percent in  1980), with  some recovery  in 
manufacturing. Inflation  fell  from  28.7  to  21.3  percent  within  the  year. 
However, the current account deficit remained at nearly 7 percent of  GNP 
and external debt had risen to 48.4 percent of GNP, with a womsome 26.1 
percent of  the debt being short term.  Inflation remained high by  historical 
standards. Furthermore, gross fixed investment had fallen from 31.8 percent 
of GNP during 1978 -  80 to 28.9 percent of GNP during 198  1. 
A new  policy package to revive the economy was introduced in January 
1982. The  interest differential on  preferential  loans  was  eliminated.  The 
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May  1982 resulted  in further credit expansion in order to bail out firms in 
trouble."  The growth rate of M1 jumped to over 45 percent.  At the  same 
time,  there  was  little  change in  the  fiscal  position  and  the  real  effective 
exchange rate appreciated by  nearly 4  percent.  Furthermore, world demand 
stagnated. 
Economic  performance  in  1982 was  mixed. The growth  of  exports fell 
from 20.1 percent  in  1981 to only  1 percent  in  1982. As a consequence, 
there was a moderation of  output growth. This time, neither agriculture nor 
manufacturing grew strongly.  Instead,  construction and other services were 
the sources of growth. External debt rose an additional 4 percent of GNP to 
52.7 percent.  However, there were substantial improvements  in the current 
account and in inflation. The current account deficit declined from 6.9 to 3.7 
percent of GNP. We return to the discussion of current account improvement 
with growth in chapter 7. 
Even more striking is that inflation  fell from 21.3 to 7.2 percent.  Three 
factors contributed to the large drop. The first was the sustained slowdown in 
nominal wage growth. Real wages had declined in both  1980 and 1982. The 
second  was  a  small  terms  of  trade  improvement.  The  third  was  a  real 
currency appreciation.  Although  the won depreciated against the dollar, the 
nominal  effective  exchange  rate  remained  constant  and  the  real  effective 
exchange rate appreciated. 
By  1983 the Korean economy was performing  strongly.  Real growth was 
nearly  12 percent, while inflation had fallen below 4 percent and the current 
account deficit had been reduced to just 2 percent of GNP. 
Where did the 1983  boom come from? The simple accounting decomposition 
(ch. 7) shows that Korean exports, investment,  and private consumption all 
grew strongly.  The expansion was not  attributable to increased  government 
spending. The sectoral decomposition shows that expansion of manufacturing 
contributed nearly 4 percentage  points,  as compared  to just  1.3 percentage 
points  in  1982. There had  been  some improvement  in external conditions. 
World growth had resumed-industrial  countries grew by 2.6 percent in 1983 
as compared to -  0.2 percent in 1982 and an average of  1.4 percent per year 
during 1980-81. 
Increased international competitiveness  enabled  Korea to take advantage 
of  the  stronger  world  demand. Further nominal  exchange rate  adjustment 
had led to over 10 percent additional real depreciation since 1980. Domestic 
wage  growth  had  also slowed. Despite  a  slowdown  in  labor  productivity 
during the early 1980s, unit labor costs measured in dollars declined by  16.6 
percent  over  1979-83.  During  the  same period,  (dollar)  unit  labor  costs 
remained constant for Hong Kong and rose by 28 percent for Taiwan.  l1 
Other  internal  factors  had  also  improved.  Many  of  the  controls  and 
restrictions  introduced  during  the  1970s  had  been  relaxed.  Agricultural 
output had  revived.  In addition,  the social  and political  climate had  eased 
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By  1983 Korea  had  dealt  with  the  major  economic  difficulties  from 
1979-80.  Furthermore,  macroeconomic  stabilization  had  been  achieved 
without  compromising  high  rates  of  capital  formation.  Investment  had 
remained strong throughout  1980-82  even though domestic savings did not 
begin to recover until  1983. A critical point here is that Korea was able to 
continue to borrow from abroad during its crisis period and these funds were 
used to maintain investment.  It is very unlikely  that Korea would have had 
this option if the crisis years had been 1982-83.  Korea was lucky to run into 
difficulty before most of the other debtor countries. 
4.3.4  Successful Adjustment,  1983-86 
As a  result  of  the  very  favorable  1983 economic  performance,  Korean 
policy shifted away from a focus on short-run  macroeconomic  stabilization 
(prices  and  the  balance  of  payments), turning  again  to issues  of  long-run 
structural  development.  The  point  is  important  in  contrasting  Korea’s 
experience with that of other developing country debtors. For most of them, 
1983 was the beginning of  the crisis. For Korea, the major adjustments had 
already been accomplished. 
The government  launched a revision  of  the fifth five-year plan, to be in 
effect  from  1984 to  1986. In  the  revised  plan  it  was  explained  that  the 
economy had already achieved the major goals of price stability and renewed 
export and  output  growth, as set forth in  the  original  plan.  The revision, 
‘‘rather than being  oriented to quantitative targets,  emphasizes  institutional 
reforms and structural improvements ...  to make a major shift in the style of 
economic  management  toward  relying  more  on  competition  and  market 
mechanism and to solve the problems of imbalance”  (Government of Korea 
1983,  iii,  3).  The  revised  plan  very  clearly  shows  the  policy  shift  to 
structural  adjustment  and  long-term  growth.  For  example,  it  states  that 
Korea’s  “remarkable  [  1980-831  performance  has  laid  the  foundation  for 
another  economic  takeoff”  and  that  Korea  was  “forging  ahead  towards 
joining the ranks of  advanced industrial countries”  (3). 
Against  this  backdrop,  both  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  were  tightened 
significantly  in conjunction  with  a new  IMF program, in  effect  from July 
1983 through March 1985. The fiscal deficit was reduced from 4.3 percent of 
GP in  1982 to  1.6 percent in  1983. MI growth was slowed to  17.0 percent 
during  1983 and 0.5 percent  during  1984. The nominal exchange rate was 
managed so as to depreciate the won by 5.7 percent in real terms from 1982 
to 1984. Economic performance remained strong in 1984. Growth exceeded 
8 percent.  The current account  improved  further as domestic  savings rose. 
Inflation fell below 3 percent. 
In  1985 the real  growth  rate  slowed  to 5 percent.  This development  is 
partially attributable to  a slowdown in world  economic activity.  The dollar 
value of Korean exports grew by just 4 percent and exports contributed only 
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1983.  However,  inflation  rates  remained  low  and  the  current  account 
continued to improve. Korea’s debt position also improved. Short-term debt, 
as a share of  total debt, declined from 26 percent in  1981 to  19 percent in 
1985, and the ratio of  debt service to exports dropped from 57 percent in 
1982 to 49 percent in 1985. 
The  government  initiated  further  depreciation  of  the  won  in  order  to 
bolster  Korea’s competitiveness. In  real  terms,  the  won  depreciated by  6 
percent during 1985 and by  an additional 15 percent in  1986. 
Nineteen  eighty-six was  a  banner  year  for  the  Korean  economy.  Real 
growth reached  12.5 percent, inflation remained at just 2.3 percent and the 
current account registered a $4.6 billion surplus (nearly 5 percent of GNP).’* 
In  stark contrast to  most  of  the other debtor countries which experienced 
further deterioration in their debt indicators,  l3 Korea’s debt to GNP ratio fell 
from 56.3 to 46.8 percent as its debt stock was reduced by  $2.25 billion. 
Strong growth in  the industrial countries,  lower interest rates,  a dramatic 
terms of  trade improvement (primarily from the drop in oil prices), and the 
substantial real depreciation all contributed to the impressive performance. 
Korea’s adjustment has been extremely successful on the macroeconomic 
stabilization front. The balance of payments, inflation, growth, and the debt 
burden  have  all  improved  dramatically since, 1979-81.  In  the  following 
chapters,  we  turn  from  a  chronological  analysis  to  an  examination  of 
individual pieces of  the performance. These pieces are synthesized and our 
main conclusions are summarized in the final chapter. 
5  Internal versus External Shocks 
AS described in chapter 4, Korea experienced large current account deficits, 
slowdowns  in  growth,  and  rapid  accumulation  of  external  debt  during 
1974-77  and again during 1979-83.  In both periods, the poor performance 
coincided  with  internal  as  well  as  external  developments.  This  chapter 
evaluates  the  relative  importance  of  internal  versus  external  factors  in 
explaining the current account imbalances during each of these periods. 
Our analysis draws from two approaches. The first begins with the current 
account identity and decomposes the change in  the current account from a 
base year into price, income, interest rate, and other effects. This approach 
does  not  take  into  account  shifts  in  behavior  of  domestic  residents 
(importers, monetary authorities, etc.). Our second decomposition, based on 
the  KDI  Quarterly  Macroeconomic  model,  incorporates  a  more  fully 
specified  set  of  behavioral  relationships.  The  basic  characteristics of  the 